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Abstract
We address the problem of integrating information coming from
different sources. The information consists of facts that a central
server collects and tries to combine using (a) a set of logical rules, i.e.
a logic program, and (b) a hypothesis representing the server’s own
estimates. In such a setting incomplete information from a source or
contradictory information from different sources necessitate the use of
many-valued logics in which programs can be evaluated and hypothe-
ses can be tested. To carry out such activities we propose a formal
framework based on bilattices such as Belnap’s four-valued logics. In
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this framework we work with the class of programs defined by Fit-
ting and we develop a theory for information integration. We also
establish an intuitively appealing connection between our hypothesis
testing mechanism on the one hand, and the well-founded semantics
and Kripke-Kleene semantics of Datalog programs with negation, on
the other hand.
Keywords : deductive databases and knowledge bases, information
integration, logics of knowledge, inconsistency, bilattices.
1 Introduction
In several information oriented activities there is a need for combining (or
“integrating”) information coming from different sources.
A typical example of such information-oriented activity is building a data
warehouse, i.e. a special kind of very large database for decision-making
support in big enterprises [1]. The information stored in a data warehouse is
obtained from queries to operational databases internal to the enterprise, and
from remote information sources external to the enterprise accessed through
the Internet. The answers to all such queries are then combined (by the
so-called “integrator”) to derive the information to be stored in the data
warehouse.
The basic pattern of the data warehouse paradigm, i.e. collection of infor-
mation then integration, is encountered in many different situations. What
changes usually from one situation to another is the type (and volume) of
the collected information and the means used for the integration.
In this paper we address a specific problem of information integration,
namely, the information consists of facts that a central server collects from
a number of autonomous sources and then tries to combine them using:
• a set of logical rules, i.e. a logic program, and
• a hypothesis, representing the server’s own estimates.
In such a setting incomplete information from a source or contradictory
information coming from different sources necessitate the use of many-valued
logics, in which programs can be evaluated and hypotheses can be tested. Let
us see a simple example.
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Example 1 Consider a legal case where a judge (the “central server”) has to
decide whether to charge a person named John accused of murder. To do so,
the judge first collects facts from two different sources: the public prosecutor
and the person’s lawyer. The judge then combines the collected facts using
a set of rules in order to reach a decision. For the sake of our example let us
suppose that the judge has collected a set of facts F that he combines using
a set of rules R as follows:
F
[
witness(John) false
friends(John, Ted) true
]
1
R


suspect(X) ← motive(X) ∨ witness(X)
innocent(X) ← ∃Y (alibi(X, Y ) ∧ ¬friends(X, Y ))
friends(X, Y ) ← friends(Y,X) ∨ (friends(X,Z) ∧ friends(Z, Y ))
charge(X) ← suspect(X)⊕ ¬innocent(X)
The first fact of F says that there is no witness, i.e. the fact witness(John)
is false. The second fact of F says that Ted is a friend of John, i.e. the fact
friends(John, Ted) is true.
Turning now to the set of rules, the first rule of R describes how the
prosecutor works: in order to support the claim that a person X is a suspect,
the prosecutor tries to provide a motive and/or a witness.
The second rule of R describes how the lawyer works: in order to support
the claim that X is innocent, the lawyer tries to provide an alibi for X by a
person who is not a friend of X . This rule depends on the third rule which
defines the relation friends.
Finally, the fourth rule of R is the “decision making rule” and describes
how the judge works: in order to reach a decision as to whether to charge
X , the judge examines the premises suspect(X) and ¬innocent(X). As ex-
plained earlier, the values of these premises come from two different sources:
the prosecutor and the lawyer. Each of these premises can have the value
true or false. However, it is also possible that the value of a premiss is un-
defined. For example, if a motive is not known and a witness has not been
found, then the value of suspect(X) will be undefined.
1That notation means that the only facts which are defined (or assigned to logical
values different from unknown) are witness(John) which is false and friends(John, Ted)
which is true.
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In view of these observations, the question is what value is appropriate
to associate with charge(X).
What we propose is to collect together the values of the premises sus-
pect(X) and ¬innocent(X), and to consider the resulting set of values as the
value of charge(X). This is precisely what the notation
charge(X)← suspect(X)⊕ ¬innocent(X)
means, where ⊕ denotes the “collecting together” operation.
It follows that there are four possible values for charge(X) : ∅, {true},
{false} and {true, false}. We shall call these values : Underdefined, True,
False and Overdefined, and we shall denote them by U , T , F and O,
respectively.
The value Underdefined for a premiss means that the premiss is true or
false but its actual value is currently unknown. For the purpose of this paper
we shall assume that any premiss whose value is not known is associated with
the value Underdefined.
We note that the value Underdefined is related to the so-called “null
values” of attributes in database theory. In database theory, however, a
distinction is made between two types of null values [22]:
• the attribute value exists but is currently unknown;
• the attribute value does not exist.
An example of the first type is the Department-value for an employee that
has just been hired but has not yet been assigned to a specific department,
and an example of the second type is the maiden name of a male employee.
The value Underdefined corresponds to the first type of null value.
Returning now to our example, the decision whether to charge John de-
pends on the value that charge(John) will receive when collecting the values
of the premises together. Looking at the facts of F and the rules of R (and
using intuition) we can see that suspect(John) and innocent(John) both re-
ceive the value U and so then does charge(John).
This is clearly a case where the judge cannot decide whether to actually
charge John!
In the context of decision making, however, one has to reach a decision
(based on the available facts and rules) even if some values are not defined.
This can be accomplished by assuming values for some or all underdefined
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premises. Such an assignment of values to underdefined premises is what we
call a hypothesis.
Thus in our example, if the judge assumes the innocence of John, then
charge(John) receives the value false and John is not charged. We note that
this is precisely what happens in real life under similar circumstances, i.e.
the defendant is assumed innocent until proved guilty.
Clearly, when hypothesizing on underdefined premises we would like our
hypothesis to be “reasonable” in some sense, with respect to the available
information, i.e., with respect to the given facts and rules. Roughly speaking,
we define a hypothesis H to be “reasonable” or sound using the following
test :
calling a fact f defined under H if H(f) 6= U ,
1. add H to F to produce a new set of facts F ′ = F ∪H ;
2. apply the rules of R to F ′ to produce a new assignment of values H ′;
3. if the facts defined under H are assigned to the same values in H ′ then
H is sound, otherwise H is not sound.
That is, if there is no fact of H that has changed value as a result of rule
application then H is a sound hypothesis; otherwise H is unsound.
In our example, for instance, consider the following hypothesis:
H1 =
[
innocent(John) T
charge(John) T
]
Applying the above test we find the following values for the facts of H1 :
H ′1 =
[
innocent(John) T
charge(John) F
]
As we can see, the fact charge(John) has changed value, i.e. this fact had
the value T in H1 and now has the value F in H
′
1. Therefore, H1 is not a
sound hypothesis.
Next, consider the following hypothesis:
H2 =
[
innocent(John) T
charge(John) F
]
Applying again our test we find :
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H ′2 =
[
innocent(John) T
charge(John) F
]
That is, the values of the facts of H2 remain unchanged in H
′
2, thus H2
is a sound hypothesis.
Intuitively, if our hypothesis is sound this means that what we have as-
sumed is compatible with the given facts and rules.
From now on let us denote P the facts of F together with the rules of R,
i.e. P = 〈F,R〉, and let us call P a program.
In principle, we may assume or hypothesize values for every possible
ground atom. However, given a program P and a hypothesis H , we can-
not expect H to be sound with respect to P, in general. What we can expect
is that some “part” of H is sound with respect to P.
More precisely, given two hypotheses H and H ′, call H a part of H ′,
denoted H ≤ H ′, if H(f) 6= U implies H(f) = H ′(f), i.e., if H agrees with
H ′ on every defined fact. It is then natural to ask, given program P and
hypothesis H , what is the maximal part of H that is sound with respect to
P. We call this maximal part the support of H by P, and we denote it by
sHP . Intuitively, the support of H indicates how much of H can be assumed
safely, i.e., remaining compatible with the facts and rules of P.
We show that the support sHP can be used to define a hypothesis-based
semantics of P = 〈F,R〉, denoted by semHP . This is done by a fixpoint
computation that uses an immediate consequence operator T as follows:
• F0 = F ;
• Fi+1 = T (Fi)⊕ s
H
〈Fi,R〉
.
We also show that there is an interesting connection between hypothesis
based semantics and the semantics of Datalog programs with negation. More
precisely, we show that if P is a Datalog program with negation then:
• if H is the everywhere false hypothesis then semHP coincides with the
well-founded semantics of P [20], and
• if H is the everywhere underdefined hypothesis then semHP coincides
with the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P [5].
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As we shall see, these results allow us to extend the well-founded seman-
tics and the Kripke-Kleene semantics of Datalog program with negation to
the broader class of Fitting programs [8].
Motivation for this work comes from the area of knowledge acquisition,
where contradictions may occur during the process of collecting knowledge
from different experts. Indeed, in multi-agent systems, different agents may
give different answers to the same query. It is then important to be able to
process the answers so as to extract the maximum of information on which
the various agents agree, or to detect the items on which the agents give
conflicting answers.
Motivation also comes from the area of deductive databases. Updates
leading to a certain degree of inconsistency should be allowed because in-
consistency can lead to useful information, especially within the framework
of distributed databases. In particular, Fuhr and Ro¨lleke showed in [9] that
hypermedia information retrieval requires the handling of inconsistent infor-
mation and non-uniform hypotheses.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall
very briefly some definitions and notations from well-founded semantics, Bel-
nap’s logic FOUR, bilattices and Fitting programs. We then proceed, in Sec-
tion 3, to define sound hypotheses and their support by a Fitting program P;
we also discuss computational issues and we present algorithms for comput-
ing the support of a hypothesis by a program P and the hypothesis-founded
semantics of P. In Section 4 we show that the notion of support actually
unifies the notions of well-founded semantics and Kripke-Kleene semantics
and extends them from Datalog program with negation to the broader class
of Fitting programs. Section 5 contains concluding remarks and suggestions
for further research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Three-valued logics
2.1.1 Well founded semantics
Well-founded semantics of logic programs were first proposed in [20]. The well
founded semantics of a Program P is based on the closed world assumption,
i.e. every atom is supposed to be false by default. In the approach of [20] an
interpretation I is a set of ground literals that does not contain literals of the
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form A and ¬A. Now, if we consider an instantiated program P defined as in
[20], its well-founded semantics is defined using the following two operators
on partial interpretations I :
• the immediate consequence operator TP , defined by
TP (I) = {head(r) | r ∈ P ∧ ∀B ∈ body(r), B ∈ I}, and
• the unfounded operator UP , where UP (I) is defined to be the greatest
unfounded set with respect to the partial interpretation I.
We recall that a set of instantiated atoms U is said to be unfounded with
respect to I if for all instantiated atoms A ∈ U and for all rules r ∈ P the
following holds:
head(r) = A⇒ ∃B ∈ body(r) (¬B ∈ I ∨ B ∈ U)
In [4] it is proven that UP (I) = HB \ SPFP (I), where HB is the Her-
brand Base and SPFP (I) is the limit of the increasing sequence [SPF
i(I)]i≥1
defined by:
− SPF 1P (I) = {head(r) | r ∈ P ∧pos(body(r)) = ∅
∧∀B ∈ body(r),¬B 6∈ I}
− SPF i+1P (I) = {head(r) | r ∈ P ∧pos(body(r)) ⊆ SPF
i
P (I)
∧∀B ∈ body(r),¬B 6∈ I}, i > 0.
The atoms of SPFP (I) are called potentially founded atoms.
The operator WP , called the well-founded operator, is then defined by
WP (I) = TP (I) ∪ ¬UP (I) and is shown to be monotone with respect to set
inclusion. The well-founded semantics of P is defined to be the least fixpoint
of WP [20].
2.1.2 Kripke-Kleene semantics
The Kripke-Kleene semantics was introduced in [5]. In the approach of [5],
a valuation is a function from the Herbrand base to the set of logical values
{true, false, unknown}. Now, given an instantiated program P defined
as in [5], its Kripke-Kleene semantics is defined using an operator ΦP on
valuations, defined as follows : given a ground atom A,
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• if there is a rule in P with head A, and the truth value of the body
under v is true, then ΦP(v)(A) = true;
• if there is a rule in P with head A, and for every rule in P with head
A the truth value of the body under v is false, then ΦP(v)(A) = false;
• else ΦP(v)(A) = unknown.
The Kripke-Kleene semantics of a Program P is based on the open world
assumption, i.e. every atom is supposed to be unknown by default, and
is defined to be is the iterated fixpoint of ΦP obtained by beginning the
iteration with the everywhere unknown valuation.
2.2 Multi-valued logics
2.2.1 Belnap’s four-valued logic
In [3], Belnap defines a logic called FOUR intended to deal with incomplete
and inconsistent information. Belnap’s logic uses four logical values that we
shall denote by F , T , U and O , i.e. FOUR = {F , T , U , O}. These values
can be compared using two orderings, the knowledge ordering and the truth
ordering.
In the knowledge ordering, denoted by ≤k, the four values are ordered as
follows: U ≤k F , U ≤k T , F ≤k O, T ≤k O. Intuitively, according to this
ordering, each value of FOUR is seen as a possible knowledge that one can
have about the truth of a given statement. More precisely, this knowledge
is expressed as a set of classical truth values that hold for that statement.
Thus, F is seen as {false}, T is seen as {true}, U is seen as ∅ and O is seen
as {false,true}. Following this viewpoint, the knowledge ordering is just the
set inclusion ordering.
In the truth ordering, denoted by ≤t, the four logical values are ordered
as follows: F ≤t U , F ≤t O, U ≤t T , O ≤t T . Intuitively, according to
this ordering, each value of FOUR is seen as the degree of truth of a given
statement. U and O are both less false than F , and less true than T , but U
and O are not comparable.
The two orderings are represented in the double Hasse diagram of Fig-
ure 1.
Both ≤t and ≤k give FOUR a lattice structure. Meet and join under the
truth ordering are denoted by ∧ and ∨, and they are natural generalizations
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Figure 1: The logic FOUR
of the usual notions of conjunction and disjunction. In particular, U∧O= F
and U∨O= T . Under the knowledge ordering, meet and join are denoted by
⊗ and ⊕, and are called the consensus and gullibility, respectively: x ⊗ y
represents the maximal information on which x and y agree, whereas x ⊕ y
adds the knowledge represented by x to that represented by y. In particular,
F⊗T = U and F⊕T = O.
There is a natural notion of negation in the truth ordering denoted by
¬, and we have: ¬ T = F , ¬ F= T , ¬ U= U , ¬ O= O. There is a similar
notion for the knowledge ordering, called conflation, denoted by -, and we
have: - U= O, - O= U , - F= F , - T = T .
The operations ∨,∧,¬ restricted to the values T and F are those of clas-
sical logic, and if we add to these operations and values the value U then
they are those of Kleene’s strong three-valued logic.
2.2.2 Bilattices
In [6, 14], bilattices are used as truth-value spaces for integration of infor-
mation coming from different sources. The bilattice approach is a basic
contribution to many-valued logics. Bilattices and their derived sublogics
are useful in expressing uncertainty and inconsistency in logic programming
and databases [2, 6, 8, 10, 15, 18]. The simplest non-trivial bilattice is called
FOUR, and it is basically Belnap’s four-valued logic [3].
Definition 1 A bilattice is a triple 〈B,≤t,≤k〉, where B is a nonempty set
and ≤t, ≤k are each a partial ordering giving B the structure of a lattice with
a top and a bottom.
In a bilattice 〈B,≤t,≤k〉, meet and join under ≤t are denoted ∨ and ∧,
and meet and join under ≤k are denoted ⊕ and ⊗. Top and bottom under
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≤t are denoted T and F , and top and bottom under ≤k are denoted I and
U . If the bilattice is complete with respect to both orderings, infinitary meet
and join under ≤t are denoted
∨
and
∧
, and infinitary meet and join under
≤k are denoted
⊕
and
⊗
.
Definition 2 A bilattice 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 is called distributive if all 12 distributive
laws connecting ∨, ∧, ⊕ and ⊗ hold. It is called infinitely distributive if it
is a complete bilattice in which all infinitary, as well as finitary, distributive
laws hold.
An example of a distributive law is x ⊗ (y ∨ z) = (x ⊗ y) ∨ (x ⊗ z). An
example of an infinitary distributive law is x⊗
∨
{yi|i ∈ S} =
∨
{x⊗yi|i ∈ S}.
Definition 3 A bilattice 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 satisfies the interlacing conditions if
each of the operations ∨, ∧, ⊕ and ⊗ is monotone with respect to both
orderings. If the bilattice is complete, it satisfies the infinitary interlacing
conditions if each of the infinitary meet and join is monotone with respect to
both orderings.
An example of an interlacing condition is: x1 ≤t y1 and x2 ≤t y2 implies
x1 ⊗ x2 ≤t y1 ⊗ y2. An example of an infinitary interlacing condition is:
xi ≤t yi for all i ∈ S implies
⊕
{xi|i ∈ S} ≤t
⊕
{yi|i ∈ S}. A distributive
bilattice satisfies the interlacing conditions.
FOUR is an infinitary distributive bilattice which satisfies the infinitary
interlacing laws. A bilattice is said to be nontrivial if the bilattice FOUR
can be isomorphically embedded in it.
There are two principal ways for constructing bilattices that were intro-
duced in [12], and then developped in details in [6]. The first one consists in
considering two lattices 〈L1,≤1〉 and 〈L2,≤2〉. We can see L1 as the set of
values used for representing the degree of belief (evidence, confidence, etc.)
of an information and L2 as the set of values used for representing the degree
of doubt (counter-evidence, lack of confidence, etc.) of the information.
We define the structure L1 ⊙ L2 to be the structure 〈L1 × L2,≤t,≤k〉
where:
• 〈x, y〉 ≤t 〈z, w〉 iff x ≤ z and w ≤ y,
(〈x, y〉 ∧ 〈z, w〉 = 〈min(x, z), max(y, w)〉), and
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• 〈x, y〉 ≤k 〈z, w〉 iff x ≤ z and y ≤ w
(〈x, y〉 ⊗ 〈z, w〉 = 〈min(x, z), min(y, w)〉).
L1 ⊙ L2 is a bilattice satisfying the interlacing conditions; it is a com-
plete bilattice satisfying the infinitary interlacing conditions if L1 and L2 are
complete; it is infinitely distributive if L1 and L2 are complete and infinitely
distributive. Moreover, if L = L1 = L2, then a negation can be defined by
¬〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉.
The following example illustrates possible uses of such a bilattice.
Example 2 Suppose that we have two information sources: two veterinaries
v1 and v2, and that we want to know the answer to the query: Is Marguerite
a crazy cow ?
If v1 asserts that the probability she is mad is 70%, and v2 asserts that the
probability she is not mad is 40%, then this knowledge can be represented by
assigning to the atom Mad(Marguerite) the logical value (0.7, 0.4) ∈ [0; 1]×
[0; 1].
Such values could also be useful when each source can only answer by true
or false, but is associated to a specific degree of reliability. The value (0.7, 0.4)
could then represent the fact that v1 asserts that she is mad whereas v2 asserts
that she is not mad, but that we are more confident in diagnostics of v1 than
in those of v2. That difference of reliability or confidence being represented
by the assignation of different degrees of reliability to information sources, in
our example, v1 would be supposed reliable for 70% and v2 for 40%.
The second way of constructing a bilattice consists in interpreting values
as approximations of exact values. Suppose we have a lattice 〈L,≤L〉 of
truth values. An approximation of a truth value can be seen as an interval
[a, b] = {x | a ≤L x ≤L b} containing that value. We can provide to the set
of intervals a structure of bilattice 〈O(L),≤t,≤k〉 such that, for [a, b], [c, d] ∈
O(L):
• [a, b] ≤k [c, d] if a ≤L c and d ≤L b, and
• [a, b] ≤t [c, d] if a ≤L c and b ≤L d.
The intuition is that knowledge increases if the interval become shorter
and truth increases if the interval contains greater values.
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By abuse of notation we will sometimes talk about the bilattice B when
the orders are irrelevant or understood from the context. From now on, we
assume that B is an infinitely distributive bilattice that satisfy the infinitary
interlacing conditions and has a negation unless explicitly stated otherwise.
2.2.3 Fitting programs
Conventional logic programming has the set {F , T } as its intended space of
truth values but since not every query may produce an answer partial models
are often allowed (i.e. U is added). If we want to deal with inconsistency as
well then O must be added. Thus Fitting asserts that FOUR can be thought
as the “home” of ordinary logic programming and extends the notion of logic
program, as follows:
Definition 4 (Fitting program)
• A formula is an expression built up from literals and elements of B,
using ∧,∨,⊗,⊕, ∃, ∀.
• A clause is of the form P (x1, ..., xn)←− φ(x1, ..., xn), where the atomic
formula P (x1, ..., xn) is the head, and the formula φ(x1, ..., xn) is the
body. It is assumed that the free variables of the body are among
x1, ..., xn.
• A program is a finite set of clauses with no predicate letter appearing
in the head of more than one clause (this apparent restriction causes
no loss of generality [6]).
We shall represent a Fitting program as a pair 〈F,R〉 where F is a function
from the Herbrand base into B and R a set of clauses. This is possible because
every fact can be seen as a rule of the form A← v, where A is an atom and
v is a value in B.
A Datalog program with negation can be seen as a Fitting program whose
underlying truth-value space is the subset {F , T ,U} of B and which does not
involve ⊗,⊕, ∀,U ,O,F .
3 Hypothesis Testing
In the remaining of this paper, in order to simplify the presentation, we
assume that all Fitting programs are instantiated programs. Moreover, we
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use the term “program” to mean “Fitting program”, unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
3.1 Interpretations
First, we introduce some terminology and notation that we shall use through-
out the paper. Given a program P, call interpretation of P any function I
over the Herbrand base HBP such that, for every atom A of HBP , I(A) is a
value from B.
Two interpretations I and J are compatible if, for every ground atom A,
(I(A) 6= U and J(A) 6= U)⇒ I(A) = J(A).
An interpretation I is a part of an interpretation J , denoted I ≤ J , if
I(A) 6= U implies I(A) = J(A), for every ground atom A. Clearly, the part-of
relation just defined is a partial ordering on the set V(B) of all interpretations
over B. Given an interpretation I, we denote by def(I) the set of all ground
atoms A such that I(A) 6= U . Moreover, if S is any set of ground atoms, we
define the restriction of I to S, denoted by I/S as follows: for all A ∈ HBP ,
I/S(A) =
{
I(A) if A ∈ S,
U , otherwise.
We can extend the two orderings of B (i.e. the truth ordering and the
knowledge ordering) to the set V(B) as follows: Let I1 and I2 be in V(B),
then
• I1 ≤t I2 if and only if I1(A) ≤t I2(A) for all ground atoms A;
• I1 ≤k I2 if and only if I1(A) ≤k I2(A) for all ground atoms A.
Under these two orderings V(B) becomes a bilattice, and we have
(I ∧ J)(A) = I(A) ∧ J(A), and similarly for the other operators. V(B)
is distributive, satisfies the interlacing conditions and has a negation and a
conflation.
The operations of B can be extended naturaly to V(B) in the following
way: I ⊕ J(A) = I(A)⊕ J(A) and similarly for the other operations.
The actions of interpretations can be extended from atoms to formulas
as follows:
• I(X ∧ Y ) = I(X) ∧ I(Y ), and similarly for the other operators,
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• I((∃x)φ(x)) =
∨
t=closedterm I(φ(t)), and
• I((∀x)φ(x)) =
∧
t=closedterm I(φ(t)).
If B is a closed formula then we say that B evaluates to the logical value
α, with respect to an interpretation I, denoted by B ≡ α w.r.t. I or by
B ≡I α, if J(B) = α for any interpretation J such that I ≤ J (i.e. if the
value of B is equal to α with respect to the defined atoms of I whatever
the values of underdefined atoms could be). There are formulas B in which
underdefined atoms do not matter for the logical value that can be associated
with B. For example let us take B = A ∨ C and let the interpretation I be
defined by I(A) = U , I(C) = T ; then no matter how A is interpreted B is
evaluated to T , that is, B ≡I T .
Given an interpretation I, let IO be the interpretation defined by : if
I(A) 6= U then IO(A) = I(A) else IO(A) = O, for every atom A. Using the
interlacing conditions, we have the following lemma that provides a method
of testing whether B ≡I α, based on the interpretation IO.
Lemma 1 Given a closed formula B, B ≡I α iff I(B) = α and IO(B) = α.
3.2 The Support of a Hypothesis
Given a program P = 〈F,R〉, we consider two ways of inferring information
from P. First by activating the rules of R in order to derive new facts from
those of F , through an immediate consequence operator T . Second, by a
kind of default reasoning based on a given hypothesis.
Definition 5 (immediate consequence operator T ) The immediate con-
sequence operator T takes as input the facts of F and returns an interpreta-
tion T (F ), defined as follows: for all ground atoms A,
• if there is a rule A← B ∈ R, then TR(F )(A) = α if B ≡F α,
• TR(F )(A) = U , otherwise.
What we call a hypothesis is actually just an interpretation H . However,
we use the term “hypothesis” to stress the fact that the values assigned by
H to the atoms of the Herbrand base are assumed values - and not values
that have been computed using the facts and rules of the program. As such,
a hypothesis H must be tested against the “sure” knowledge provided by P.
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The test consists of “adding” H to F , then activating the rules of P (using
T ) to derive an interpretation H ′. If H ≤ H ′, then the hypothesis H is a
sound one, i.e. the values defined by H are not in contradiction with those
defined by P. Hence the following definition:
Definition 6 (Sound Hypothesis) Let P = 〈F,R〉 be a program and H a
hypothesis. H is sound w.r.t. P if
• F and H are compatible, and
• H/Head(P) ≤ T (F ⊕H), where Head(P) = {A | ∃A ← B ∈ P}.
We use the restriction of H to Head(P) before making the comparison
with T (F ⊕H) because all atoms which are not head of any rule of P will be
assigned to the value Underdefined by T (F ⊕H). Then H and T (F ⊕H)
are compatible on these atoms.
The following example illustrates the definition of sound hypothesis with
respect to a logic program.
Example 3 We consider the program P = 〈F ,R〉 defined by :
F =
[
witness(Jean) T
]
2
R


suspect(X) ← motive(X) ∨ witness(X)
innocent(X) ← ∃Y (alibi(X, Y ) ∧ ¬friends(X, Y ))
friends(X, Y ) ← friends(Y,X) ∨ (friends(X,Z) ∧ friends(Z, Y ))
charge(X) ← suspect(X)⊕ ¬innocent(X)
Let H be the following hypothesis :
H =


witness(Jean) F
motive(Jean) F
suspect(Jean) F
innocent(Jean) T


2That notation means that the only atom which is assigned to a logical value different
from U in F is witness(Jean) and that its value is T .
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We can easily note that H is not sound with respect to P. The atom
witness(Jean) is defined in H and in F , but with different values, so H and
F are not compatible.
The maximal part of H that is compatible with F is
H’ =


motive(Jean) F
suspect(Jean) F
innocent(Jean) T


F and H ′ are compatible, so it is possible to collect the knowledge de-
fined by these two interpretation in a new one without creating conflicts or
inconsistencies.
F ⊕H ′ =


witness(Jean) T
motive(Jean) F
suspect(Jean) F
innocent(Jean) T


Then we activate the rules of R on the interpretation F ⊕H ′ :
TR(F ⊕H
′) =


witness(Jean) T
motive(Jean) F
suspect(Jean) T
charge(Jean) F


We observe that H ′ is not sound with respect to P because H ′ is not a
part of TR(F ⊕H) and is in contradiction with the derived knowledge.
Even if a hypothesis H is not sound w.r.t. P, it may be that some part
of H is sound w.r.t. P. Of course, we are interested to know what is the
maximal part of H that is sound w.r.t. P. We shall call this maximal part
the “support” of H . To see that the maximal part of H is unique (and thus
that the support is a well-defined concept), we give the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If H1 and H2 are two sound parts of H w.r.t. P, then H1 ⊕H2
is sound w.r.t. P.
Proof. H1 and H2 are both restrictions of H so they are compatible.
Moreover, H1 and H2 are two sound parts of H with respect to P, so H1 and
17
H2 are both compatible with F . It follows that H1 ⊕H2 is compatible with
F .
We also have H1/Heads(R) ≤ T (F ⊕ H1), i.e., for all atom A head of a
rule A ← B ∈ P, if H1(A) 6= U then H1(A) = T (F ⊕ H1)(A). The same
property is verified by H2. If H1 ⊕H2(A) 6= U then we have :
• either H1(A) 6= U and H2(A) = U ,
• either H2(A) 6= U and H1(A) = U ,
• either H1(A) = H2(A) 6= U .
In the first case, we have T (F ⊕H1)(A) = H1(A) = H1 ⊕H2(A), i.e.
B ≡ H1 ⊕H2(A) p.r. F ⊕H1, so B ≡ H1 ⊕H2(A) w.r.t. F ⊕H1 ⊕H2. We
have the same result in the two other cases, so
(H1 ⊕H2)/Heads(R) ≤ T (F ⊕H1 ⊕H2).
✷
Thus the maximal sound part of H is defined by
⊕
{H ′ | H ′ ≤ H and H ′
is sound w.r.t. P}.
Definition 7 (Support) Let P be a program and H a hypothesis. The
support of H w.r.t. P, denoted sHP , is the maximal sound part of H w.r.t. P
(where maximality is understood w.r.t. the part-of ordering ≤).
Example 4 Let P be the program and H the hypothesis defined in the ex-
ample 3, then the support of H with respect to P is :
sHP =
[
motive(Jean) F
]
We can remark that the support of a hypothesis with respect to a program
P = 〈R,F 〉 is compatible with the interpretation obtained by activating the
rules of R on the facts of F .
Lemma 3 Let P = 〈R,F 〉 be a logic program and H a hypothesis. TR(F )
and sHP are compatible.
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Proof. For all atom A, if A is not the head of any rule of R, then
TR(F )(A) ≤ s
H
P (A). If there is in R a rule forme A← B, then :
• if sHP (A) = H(A) 6= U , then B ≡ α w.r.t. F⊕s
H
P , and if TR(F )(A) 6= U ,
then TR(F )(A) = H(A) ;
• if TR(F )(A) = α 6= U , then B ≡ α w.r.t. F and B ≡ α w.r.t. F ⊕ s
H
P ,
and if sHP (A) 6= U , then s
H
P (A) = α.
✷
We now give an algorithm for computing the support sHP of a hypothesis
H w.r.t. a program P.
Consider the following sequence 〈PFi〉, i ≥ 0:
• PF0 = ∅;
• PFi = {A | A← B ∈ P and B 6≡ H(A) w.r.t. F⊕H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi−1}
for all i ≥ 0,
where IF (F,H) is teh set of facts that are imcompatible with H , de-
fined by IF (F,H) = {A | (F (A) 6= U)∧(H(A) 6= U)∧(F (A) 6= H(A))}.
The intuition here is that we want to evaluate step by step the atoms
that could potentially have a logical value different than their values in H .
We have the following results:
Proposition 1 The sequence 〈PFi〉, i ≥ 0 is increasing with respect to set
inclusion and it has a limit reached in a finite number of steps. This limit is
denoted PF .
Proof. We show by recurrence that for all n, PFn−1 ⊆ PFn.
PF0 = ∅ so the property is satisfied for n = 1.
Suppose that PFi−1 ⊆ PFi. Thus we have
H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi ≤ H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi−1 .
For all atom A, if there is in P a rule A ← B, then if B 6≡ H(A)
with respect to F ⊕ H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi−1 , then B 6≡ H(A) with respect to
F ⊕ H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi , and consequently, PFi = {A | A ← B ∈ P and
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B 6≡ H(A) with respect to F ⊕ H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi−1} ⊆ {A | A ← B ∈ P
and B 6≡ H(A) with respect to F ⊕H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi} = PFi+1.
✷
If an atom of the Herbrand base is not in PF , then it means that, with
respect to P, there is no way of inferring for that atom a logical value different
than its value in H w.
Theorem 1 Let P a logic program and H a hypothesis, we have
sHP = H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PF
Proof. We note X = H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PF . Firstly, we show that X is a
sound part of H with respect to P. By definition, X and F are compatible.
Let A be an atom such that there exists in R a rule A ← B and such that
X(A) = H(A) 6= U . Then A 6∈ PF and B ≡ H(A) p.r. F ⊕ X , so X is
sound.
Secondly, we prove that X is the maximal sound part of H with respect
to P. Let Y be a sound part of H . We show by recurrence that for all atom
A, if Y (A) = H(A) 6= U , then A 6∈ PFn.
If A is not the head of any rule in R, then A 6∈ PFi, for all i. PF0 = ∅ so
A 6∈ PF0. Suppose the property satisfied for n = i−1. We have, for all atom
A, if Y (A) = H(A) 6= U , then A 6∈ PFi−1, and Y ≤ H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi−1 .
If there is a rule A← B in R and Y (A) = H(A) 6= U , then
B ≡ H(A) w.r.t. F ⊕ Y because Y is sound, and it follows that
B ≡ H(A) w.r.t. F ⊕H/(HBP\IF (F,H))\PFi−1. We can conclude that A 6∈ PFi.
We have shown that for all atom A, if Y (A) = H(A) 6= U , then A 6∈ PF
and consequently, X(A) = H(A).
For all sound part Y of H , we have Y ≤ X .
✷
4 Hypothesis Founded Semantics
As we explained earlier, given a program P = 〈F,R〉, we derive informa-
tion in two ways: by activating the rules (i.e. by applying the immediate
consequence operator T) and by making a hypothesis H and computing its
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support sHP w.r.t. P. In the whole, the information that we derive comes
from T (F )⊕ sHP .
Now, roughly speaking, the semantics that we would like to associate with
a program P is the maximum of information that we can derive from P under
a sound hypothesis sHP but without any other information. To implement this
idea we proceed as follows:
1. As we don’t want any extra information (other than P and sHP ), we use
the everywhere undefined interpretation, call it IU .
2. In order to actually derive the maximum of information from P and IU ,
we collect together the knowledge infered by activating the rules of R,
i.e. by applying the operator TR, and as much of assumed knowledge
as possible, i.e. the support of H w.r.t. P.
Proposition 2 The sequence 〈Fn〉, n ≥ 0 defined by :
• F0 = F , and
• Fn+1 = TR(Fn)⊕ s
H
〈Fn,R〉
,
is increasing with respect to ≤ and has a limit denoted by semHP .
Proof. It is straighforward that TR is monotonic with respect to ≤, so for
all n, TR(Fn) ≤ TR(Fn+1).
We prove by recurrence that for all n, sH〈Fn,R〉 ≤ s
H
〈Fn+1,R〉
.
For n = 0, if sH〈F,R〉(A) = α 6= U then :
• if A is not the head of any rule in R, then sH〈F1,R〉(A) = α ;
• if there is a rule A← B in R, then B ≡ α w.r.t. sH〈F,R〉,
so B ≡ α w.r.t. sH〈F,R〉 ⊕ TR(F ) and B ≡ α w.r.t. F1.
It follows that B ≡ α w.r.t. F1 ⊕ s
H
〈F1,R〉
. Consequently, sH〈F1,R〉 = α.
The property is true for n = 0.
Now, suppose that sH〈Fn−1,R〉 ≤ s
H
〈Fn,R〉
. If sH〈Fn,R〉(A) = α 6= U , then
• if A is not the head of any rule in R, then sH〈Fn,R〉(A) = α ;
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• if there is a rule A← B in R, then B ≡ α w.r.t. Fn−1 ⊕ s
H
〈Fn−1,R〉
.
For all n, Fn⊕s
H
〈Fn,R〉
≤ TR(Fn)⊕s
H
〈Fn,R〉
. Indeed, if Fn⊕s
H
〈Fn,R〉
(A) = α 6= U ,
then :
• TR(Fn−1)(A) = α, and it follows that TR(Fn)(A) = α,
because TR(Fn−1) ≤ TR(Fn) ; or
• sH〈Fn−1,R〉(A) = α, and it follows that s
H
〈Fn,R〉
(A) = α,
because sH〈Fn−1,R〉 ≤ s
H
〈Fn,R〉
; or
• sH〈Fn,R〉(A) = α.
Consequently, B ≡ α w.r.t. TR(Fn−1)⊕ s
H
〈Fn−1,R〉
, i.e. B ≡ α w.r.t. Fn, thus
B ≡ α w.r.t. Fn ⊕ s
H
〈Fn,R〉
. Finally sH〈Fn,R〉(A) = α.
So we have for all n, TR(Fn) ≤ TR(Fn+1) and s
H
〈Fn,R〉
≤ sH〈Fn+1,R〉, following
the lemma 3, we can conclude that for all n, Fn ≤ Fn+1.
✷
Proposition 3 The interpretation semHP is a model of P.
Proof. semHP = TR(sem
H
P )⊕ s
H
〈semH
P
,R〉
. But semHP is a sound hypothesis,
so, by definition, we have
sH〈semH
P
,R〉/Heads(R)
≤ TR(sem
H
P ⊕ s
H
〈semH
P
,R〉).
It follows that
sH〈semH
P
,R〉/Teˆtes(R)
≤ TR(TR(sem
H
P )⊕ s
H
〈semH
P
,R〉),
i.e.
sH〈semH
P
,R〉/Teˆtes(R)
≤ TR(sem
H
P ).
Thus, for all rule A ← B ∈ R, semHP (A) = TR(sem
H
P )(A) = α if B ≡ α
with respect to semHP , so sem
H
P is a model of P.
✷
This justifies the following definition of semantics for P.
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Definition 8 (Hypothesis founded semantics of P) The interpretation
semHP is defined to be the semantics of P w.r.t. H or the H-founded seman-
tics of P.
Following this definition, any given program P can be associated with
different semantics, one for each possible hypothesis H . Theorem 2 below
asserts that this approach extends the usual semantics of Datalog programs
with negation to a broader class of programs, namely the Fitting programs.
Two remarks are in order here before stating Theorem 2. First, if we
restrict our attention to three values only, i.e. F , T and U , then our definition
of interpretation is equivalent to the one used by Van Gelder et als [20], in
the following sense: given an interpretation I following our definition, the
set {A | I(A) = T } ∪ {¬A | I(A) = F} is a partial interpretation following
[20]; conversely, given a partial interpretation J following [20], the function
I defined by: I(A) = T if A ∈ J , I(A) = F if ¬A ∈ J , and I(A) = U
otherwise, is an interpretation in our sense.
Second, if we restrict our attention to Datalog programs with negation
(recall that the class of Fitting programs strictly contains the Datalog pro-
grams with negation) then the concept of sound interpretation for the ev-
erywhere false hypothesis reduces to that of unfounded set of Van Gelder et
als [20]. The difference is that the definition in [20] has rather a syntactic
flavor, while ours has a semantic flavor. Moreover, our definition not only
extends the concept of unfounded set to multi-valued logic, but also gener-
alizes its definition to any given hypothesis H (not just the everywhere false
hypothesis).
Theorem 2 Let P be a Datalog programs with negation.
1. If HF is the everywhere false hypothesis, then sem
HF
P coincides with
the well-founded semantics of P;
2. If HU is the everywhere underdefined hypothesis, then sem
HU
P coincides
with the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P.
Proof. A Datalog programs with negation can be seen, in our approach,
as a set of rules of the form
A← (L1,1 ∧ ... ∧ L1,n) ∨ ... ∨ (Li,1 ∧ ... ∧ Li,m),
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where the Lp,q are litterals.
First part. Let wfs(P) be the well-founded semantics of P. We use in
this part the definition of wfs(P) given in section 2.1.1, considering all the
interpretations as functions from HBP in {F ,U , T }.
Firstly, we show that wfs(P) = TR(wfs(P))⊕ s
HF
〈wfs(P),R〉.
We know that wfs(P)(A) = T if and only if there is in P a rule
A← (L1,1 ∧ ... ∧ L1,n) ∨ ... ∨ (Li,1 ∧ ... ∧ Li,m),
such that there is (Lp,1 ∧ ... ∧Lp,q) ∈ {(L1,1 ∧ ...∧L1,n); ...; (Li,1 ∧ ... ∧Li,m)}
such that wfs(P)(Lp,1) = ... = wfs(P)(Lp,q) = T , i.e. if and only if
TR(wfs(P))(A) = T .
We know that wfs(P)(A) = F if and only if :
• either A is not the head of any rule of R, and then sHF〈wfs(P),R〉(A) = F ;
• either there is in P a rule A← (L1,1∧ ...∧L1,n)∨ ...∨ (Li,1∧ ...∧Li,m),
such that for all (Lp,1∧...∧Lp,q) ∈ {(L1,1∧...∧L1,n); ...; (Li,1∧...∧Li,m)}
there is Lp,k ∈ {Lp,1, ..., Lp,q} such that wfs(P(Lp,k) = F , i.e. if and
only if TR(wfs(P))(A) = F .
Consequently, wfs(P) = TR(wfs(P))⊕ s
HF
〈wfs(P),R〉. It follows that
semHFP ≤ wfs(P).
We prove now than semHFP ≤ T
∈
P (sem
HF
P ) ∪ UP(sem
HF
P ).
We know that semHFP (A) = T if and only if there is in P a rule
A← (L1,1 ∧ ... ∧ L1,n) ∨ ... ∨ (Li,1 ∧ ... ∧ Li,m),
such that ((L1,1∧...∧L1,n)∨...∨(Li,1∧...∧Li,m)) ≡ T w.r.t. sem
HF
P , i.e. such
that there is (Lp,1∧...∧Lp,q) ∈ {(L1,1∧...∧L1,n); ...; (Li,1∧...∧Li,m)} such that
semHFP (Lp,1) = ... = sem
HF
P (Lp,q) = T , i.e. if and only if T
∈
P (sem
HF
P )(A) =
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T .
We know that semHFP (A) = F if and only if :
• either A is not the head of any rule of R, and then UP(sem
HF
P )(A) = F ;
• either there is in P a rule A← (L1,1∧ ...∧L1,n)∨ ...∨ (Li,1∧ ...∧Li,m),
such that ((L1,1 ∧ ...∧L1,n)∨ ...∨ (Li,1 ∧ ...∧Li,m)) ≡ F w.r.t. sem
HF
P ,
i.e. for all (Lp,1 ∧ ... ∧ Lp,q) ∈ {(L1,1 ∧ ... ∧ L1,n); ...; (Li,1 ∧ ... ∧ Li,m)}
there is Lp,k ∈ {Lp,1, ..., Lp,q} such that sem
HF
P (Lp,k) ≡ F , i.e. if and
only if UP(sem
HF
P )(A) = F .
Consequently, semHFP ≤ T
∈
P (sem
HF
P ) ∪ UP(sem
HF
P ), thus wfs(P) ≤ sem
HF
P .
Second part. Let I be an interpretation, we show that TR(I) = ΦP(I) where
ΦP is the Kripke-Kleene operator.
Then ΦP(I)(A) = α 6= U if and only if there is in P a rule A← B, where
B is defined by (L1,1 ∧ ... ∧ L1,n) ∨ ... ∨ (Li,1 ∧ ... ∧ Li,m), and if :
• either there is (Lj,1 ∧ ... ∧ Lj,k) ⊆ B such that Lj,1 = ... = Lj,k = T ,
• either for all (Lj,1 ∧ ... ∧ Lj,k) ⊆ B, there is Lj,l ∈ {Lj,1, ..., Lj,k} such
that Lj,l = F .
Thus ΦP(I)(A) = α 6= U if and only if there is in P a rule A← B such that
B ≡I α, i.e. if and only if TR(I)(A) = α 6= U .
As we consider the hypothesis HU , we will infer information only with TR.
semHUP is the least fixpoint of TR with respect to the knowledge ordering, thus
sem
HU
P coincides with the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P which is the least
fixpoint of ΦP with respect to the knowledge ordering.
✷
5 Concluding remarks
We have defined a formal framework for information integration based on
hypothesis testing. A basic concept of this framework is the support provided
by a program P = 〈F,R〉 to a hypothesis H . The support ofH is the maximal
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part of H that does not contradict the facts of F or the facts derived from
F using the rules of R.
We have then used the concept of support to define hypothesis-based
semantics for the class of Fitting programs, and we have given an algorithm
for computing these semantics.
Finally, we have shown that our semantics extends the well-founded se-
mantics and the Kripke-Kleene semantics to multi-valued logics with bilat-
tice structure, and also generalizes them in the following sense: if we restrict
our attention to three-valued logics then for HF the everywhere false inter-
pretation our semantics reduces to the well-founded semantics, and for HU
the everywhere underdefined interpretation our semantics reduces to the
Kripke-Kleene semantics.
We believe that hypothesis-based semantics can be useful not only in the
context of information integration but also in the context of explanation-
based systems. Indeed, assume that a given hypothesis H turns out to be
a part of the H-semantics of a program P. Then P can be seen as an
“explanation” of the hypothesis H . We are currently investigating several
aspects of this explanation oriented viewpoint.
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